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Introduction 
 
Successful investment banking is often creative, demanding and lucrative. It became tarnished 
by the 2007-09 global financial crisis. Critics and regulators have since questioned the 
societal value of complex financial transactions, asking whether a small number of prominent 
investment banks created unwarranted systemic risks by engaging so freely in such deals as to 
be reckless. In the months that followed the September 2008 failure of Lehman Brothers, then 
a well-known US investment bank, official enquiries and court hearings in the US, Europe 
and Asia have opened modern financial practices to public scrutiny as never before. The 
result may be a period of relatively light risk-taking, intense financial regulation, and then - if 
investment banking follows the pattern of the last three decades - a new phase of 
organizational and transactional innovation.  
 
This chapter stresses the importance to investment banks of transaction innovation and 
reputational capital rather than more conventional explanations of their activities that rely on 
administrative laws or national practice. The distinction between investment and commercial 
banks that formed part of US and Japanese law for many years fully cannot explain the 
factors that drive deal formation or make investment banking either successful in its own 
terms or parasitical in the wider economy. Until the crisis that traditional distinction also 
wrongly implied a glamour or sophistication in business practice and resources. Thus 
commercial banks generate recurring revenue through providing credit to borrowers but 
investment banks conjure strategies to exploit opportunities in markets and earn fees by being 
quick-witted and nimble. Investment banks are seldom so gifted in the real world and 
commercial banks rarely so dull.  
 
Concepts 
 
Investment banking is a form of financial intermediation characterized by the making of non-
recurring transactions. Commercial banks rely on continuing interest-earning activities to 
generate revenue, so that the loan made today creates an endowment of net interest that 
accrues until it is repaid. Investment banks generate non-recurring revenues from arranging 
discrete transactions, trading on their own behalf or for clients, or otherwise doing deals. They 
raise funds through new issues of shares or debt instruments, activities that require an initial 
commitment of own resources, that is, putting capital at risk to ensure the success of a deal or 
capture profits. Activity of this kind makes risk management vital to investment banking. 
 
Financial intermediation channels savings into investment. In developed economies it takes 
place within organizations or through arrays of contracts, that is, through banks and 
institutional investors such as insurers or pension funds, or in the exchange of securities such 
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as equities or bonds. A stylized model of intermediation is shown in Figure 1. Savings 
amassed in banks and other intermediaries undergo transformations to provide funding for 
investment, or flow directly into securities, which are transferable financial instruments or 
contractual claims against an issuer. Securities are customarily bought and sold openly in 
organized markets, including stock exchanges and debt capital markets. Investment banking is 
primarily engaged in this second process.  
 
Insert Figure 1: Simplified Financial Intermediation 
 
Investment banking is driven by innovation in contract design and formation, which in turn is 
influenced by law and financial regulation. It may seek to take advantage of national or 
transnational differences in the ways that rules are applied, for example in relation to 
accounting, taxation or financial governance, processes known generally as regulatory 
arbitrage. The result is an economic rent that can be unusually lucrative, at least until 
competition erodes the profits or new regulations remove transaction incentives. This chapter 
emphasizes these powerful commercial forces. It is not concerned with any single bank 
except to illustrate how its activities are executed. We characterize investment banking as 
intermediation that relies on non-recurring revenue sources (even if predictable), as 
transactionally innovative in relation to law and regulation, and dependent upon reputational 
and human capital. Investment banks win business by demonstrating transaction prowess to 
prospective clients. The results can be mixed. A consortium acquisition of Dutch bank ABN 
Amro Holding in 2007 was notable for transaction strategy, skill and ingenuity but soon after 
completion destroyed value for investors, hastened the collapse of two of the successful 
bidders, contributed to a collapse of general confidence and created a considerable burden for 
the taxpayers of Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. Great skills were applied for a flawed 
purpose and the bank that devised and executed the transaction is no longer independent. For 
further discussion of this topic, see section Business Streams: Corporate Finance Advisory. 
 
The traditional categorization of investment and commercial banks originates in US practice 
from 1933 to the late 1980s. First, US investment banks dealt with arranging securities issues 
rather than lending, and commercial banks were largely forbidden from dealing in securities. 
Second, investment banks financed their activities in the wholesale money markets rather than 
accept deposits from individuals. All laws risk being circumvented by regulatory arbitrage, 
and so a blurring of the US commercial-investment bank distinction began in the 1980s even 
while legal restrictions remained in place. This was seen in several developments, with US 
banks engaging offshore in crossover businesses in London and elsewhere and with all banks 
replicating with new techniques the products supposedly barred to them by law. Several 
innovations contributed to the process: 
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 Commercial banks providing credit lines to underwrite client issues of commercial 
paper, or short-term corporate promissory notes. This was challenged in the US 
courts but found permissible.  
 Commercial banks increasingly using traditional credit products with great fluidly, an 
example of a trend to heightened credit risk transfer. Loans were no longer made and 
held until repayment but bought and sold in the same way as securities.  
 Profitability becoming paramount for all banks rather than the delivery of steady 
utility-type returns, and investment banks increasing their engagement with risk of all 
kinds, which itself demanded greater capital and necessitated higher returns. 
 Financial instruments and techniques converging, through the creation of derivative 
contracts and with competition from non-US banks not subject to rigid demarcations. 
 Structured or securitized transactions allowing investment banks access to lending 
activities and commercial banks to arranging and selling securities issues, all 
contributing to the increasing financialization of the global economy. 
 
This analysis is written soon after the most profound changes to the banking landscape since 
the 1930s. Although the chapter charts the performance of certain investment banks, it is 
more concerned with the process of investment banking than with any single organization or 
national corps of banks. The credit collapse that began in mid-2007 intensified 12 months 
later into a pervasive withdrawal of liquidity from banks of all types and in many countries. 
Access to wholesale funding is oxygen to all but the most conservative deposit-taking banks, 
but was especially vital for the prominent, highly-leveraged US investment banks. In a matter 
of weeks each lost its free-wheeling independence, either collapsing into insolvency (Lehman 
Brothers), merging with deposit-rich commercial banks (Merrill Lynch), or adopting a more 
conservative and closely-supervised business model and raising fresh capital from strategic 
shareholders (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley). Well-resourced competitors responded to 
fill the resulting vacuum (Barclays Capital, Greenhill, Macquarie and Nomura). All are 
criticized for contributing to the global crisis, for overpaying their directors and staff, for 
engaging in conflicted practices or simply for corporate arrogance. 
 
Origins 
 
Modern investment banks have roots in trade-based finance or investment companies in 18th 
century Europe and North America, among European merchant banking houses and banques 
d’affaires of the 19th century and in the 20th century US model of the corporate finance 
house and broker-dealer. Merchant banking came to be associated with immense political and 
financial power, notably with Francis Baring and Nathan Rothschild, the pre-eminent bankers 
of the 19th century, whose banking partnerships counseled and raised money for governments 
such that their influence ranked with statesmen. Rothschild’s bank became in 1810 an 
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affiliation of partnerships in five European states that was the world’s largest and most 
powerful, and his death in 1836 led to a prolonged loss in market confidence. Similar 
authority came to be associated in the US with J. Pierpont Morgan, whose banks raised funds 
on a massive scale for governments and corporations and whose advice was followed 
implacably in prominent corporate boardrooms.  
 
Morgan’s legacy was a trio of banks in New York and London. JPMorgan Chase and Morgan 
Stanley survive as US banks after much modification while London’s Morgan Grenfell was 
acquired by Deutsche Bank in 1990 and its name later discarded. Reforms introduced by the 
Roosevelt administration in 1933 created a banking demarcation partly to deny Pierpont 
Morgan’s heirs and competitors the same potential to control American industry and was 
abolished only in 1999. In September 2008 Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley - the two 
remaining large independent investment banks – were granted bank holding company licenses 
so that each could accept deposits, submit to federal banking supervision, and gain access to 
the Federal Reserve’s lender of last resort facilities. 
 
Functions & objectives 
 
Successful merchant banks and broker-dealers developed the core activities of modern 
investment banking, contrasted in table 1 with traditional commercial banking businesses. 
 
Table 1. Core banking functions 
Commercial banks Investment banks 
Credit creation and lending  Proprietary trading 
Deposit taking Corporate finance 
Money transmission Securities underwriting 
Trade finance Sales & trading 
Money market operations Structured finance 
 
For large investment banks in the US, Australia, Europe or Japan these functions can include 
corporate finance and broking, advice on mergers and acquisitions (M&A), fundraising, stock 
exchange listings, credit rating advice, managing privatization programs for governments, the 
sale and trading of securities, structured finance, venture capital and fund management. Most 
investment banks specialize to some degree, so Merrill Lynch is well-resourced in the 
distribution of securities while Lazard is predominantly a corporate advisory house working 
in mergers and privatization; Lehman was once a debt capital markets force. The focus of any 
bank affects its financial shape and funding needs, so that trading-oriented firms such as 
Barclays Capital or Goldman Sachs will be larger and more capital intensive than advisory 
specialists such as Greenhill or Lazard. 
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Modern investment banks differ in one crucial respect from the historic models in that they 
act not only for clients but engage in risk activities for their own account. This means 
applying accumulated capital to risk-bearing proprietary trading, investment or arbitrage. 
Putting the firm’s resources at risk can be highly profitable but easily creates conflicts with 
client interests and duties of care, and must be subject to rigorous internal scrutiny. Some 
such practices are well-known to market professionals but caused alarm in official post-crisis 
enquiries. Banks engaged in structured finance through the creation and sale of complex 
securities were affected by substantial accounting losses in the collapse of confidence 
associated with US subprime lending in 2007-08 and were later questioned as to whether their 
interests in creating securities conflicted with fiduciary duties that they might owe to investors 
or other clients.  
 
Proprietary trading is not new. British, Dutch and French merchant banks and German and 
Swiss universal banks for which no rigid business demarcations existed often held shares in 
their corporate clients. Banks in Japan and Korea have been central to the post-1949 
organization of major conglomerates though complex cross-shareholdings. Large-scale 
proprietary trading and private equity investment by banks began to spread from the US in the 
mid-1980s, and came to represent a significant activity for many investment banks. The 
reward scenario is simple: investing as principal may generate higher returns than acting 
merely as transaction arranger, even though the research and deal management demands are 
similar. The impetus for this trend came from two factors, a progressive deregulation of the 
global financial sector from the 1980s, and technological growth leading to revolutions in 
trading and the use of financial derivative contracts. To engage in proprietary activity, to 
deploy costly technology, and to maximize profits from fundraising for clients all require 
large-scale use of capital, which is costly and explains increasing concentration within global 
investment banking.  
 
Investment banks & commercial banks 
 
The divide between commercial and investment banks is one that persists colloquially, in 
much academic analysis, and for many financial regulators. Their core functions may differ 
according to the observer, which is important to the analysis shown in table 2.  
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Table 2. Concepts of commercial and investment banking 
Focus Commercial banks Investment banks  
Permissible 
activities under law 
or regulation 
Lending & deposit-taking Securities underwriting and broking 
 
Traditional 
categorizations 
Credit risk focus Lending & loan retention Underwriting & distribution 
Dominant form of 
intermediation 
Internal, based on private 
information  
External, based on public 
information 
Use of capital Large, ongoing Small, temporary 
Revenue sources Accruing interest; recurring & time dependent 
Fees; non-recurring, trading 
dependent 
Role in national 
monetary policy Critical Negligible 
Access to lender of 
last resort facility Yes No 
Regulatory focus Maintenance of capital Market probity; investor protection 
Core function in 
national & global 
financial systems 
Transaction users Financial innovators New  approach 
 
 
The approach in this chapter shown in the final row distinguishes between users and 
originators of financial instruments and services, and emphasizes innovation in the financial 
system. Innovatory behavior by investment banks is driven by their need to distinguish 
themselves from competitors and deter new entrants. Product differentiation is difficult in 
finance because new ideas and instruments are impossible to protect by copyright, and due to 
constraints imposed by national regulators. The need for product differentiation explains the 
importance of reputational capital in capturing clients. Commercial banks exist largely to 
provide credit to their clients with trade finance and lending, while investment banks market 
advice and raise funds for their clients by arranging and selling issues of securities to third 
party investors. Both engage in financial intermediation but the first is contained within an 
organization and the second is accomplished by transactions conducted across open markets 
to which many participants have access. An array of techniques has been developed since the 
1980s to monitor and manage the risks associated with all these activities.  
 
Traditional credit risk management within bank lenders involves a lengthy time horizon, with 
changes in exogenous factors such as interest rates or credit quality reflected in marginal 
adjustments to accelerate loan repayments from one group of borrowers or increase new 
lending to others. Risk management in investment banks takes a shorter time focus, and is 
concerned with the effects of exogenous change on the day-to-day value of securities held as 
inventory or in trading positions and the valuation of other contingent commitments. When 
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the generic commercial bank makes loans, it is assumed to create claims that appear as assets 
on its balance sheet until extinguished by repayment or some accounting measure to deal with 
delinquent loans. The result is less uniform when an investment bank arranges an issue of 
securities. The bank may sell the entire issue and be left with nothing to count as a balance 
sheet item, in which case it will hope to collect arrangement or underwriting fees. If sales are 
slow or deliberately managed for trading reasons it may generate additional accrued income 
from its holdings, or gain if it later sells at improving prices into a rising market. This helps 
explain the objectives of bought deals or block trading where the bank assumes the risk of an 
entire issue or large tranche of shares in expectation of placing that inventory profitably. The 
bank may elect to hold a portion of the issue for its own account to reduce price volatility or 
provide trading liquidity, or it may be obliged by the contractual terms of its underwriting 
agreement with the issuer to retain any residual unsold portion of a new issue.  
 
Bank demarcations are now operationally fuzzy. All investment banks with capital resources 
are likely to lend or extend credit to clients and the largest have for more than a decade been 
active in underwriting, arranging and distributing loans and other debt instruments not treated 
in law as securities. Many resourceful commercial banks deal in securities for their clients or 
their own account. Credit risk transfer has become vital to bank operations in all cases, in that 
the creation of a financial instrument or claim is distinct from where it resides until maturity. 
Innovation in financial practices helped remove the division. The creation of liquid money 
market funds and securitization techniques in the 1980s gave US and other investment banks 
or broker-dealers the means to compete with commercial banks in collecting savings or 
lending to consumers. New techniques to help distribute risk allowed commercial lenders for 
the first time to manage actively both sides of their balance sheets. This promised better 
returns with acceptable blends of risk. The growth of the syndicated loan markets in the 1980s 
gave commercial banks a product that could challenge the transaction advantage of 
investment banks. All financiers became more deal-oriented, focusing on using capital 
commitments to win transaction mandates with the express intention of distributing the 
resulting risk among other intermediaries. Loans and bonds grew more commercially 
fungible, and fluidity of financial claims replaced ‘lend and hold’ banking. This was a 
revolutionary seizure of investment banking skills by commercial lenders. 
 
Business streams 
 
The most important activities associated with investment banking vary over time and by 
jurisdiction but generally include: 
 
 Corporate finance advisory. 
 Capital creation in equities, debt and derivatives. 
8 
 Infrastructural finance. 
 Structured finance. 
 Securities issuance, sales and trading. 
 Proprietary trading. 
 
The discussion here concentrates on the first two. Infrastructural finance refers to long-term 
investors engaging in specialist funds for corporate finance transactions and capital projects, 
and is associated especially with Macquarie Bank. Structured finance is the creation and sale 
of complex debt contracts, some of which became notorious for precipitant losses after the 
collapse in the subprime US home mortgage market, but includes less challenging and more 
valuable forms of securitized transactions. For details of this topic within the Handbook see 
also Schwarcz S., Securitization and Structured Finance. It is common for investment banks 
to engage in asset management and private equity but these are not exclusively investment 
banking businesses. All these functions are commonly aided by economic and corporate 
research resources that prepare research for clients, to help win transaction mandates and for 
the bank’s own use. These resources can be extensive and often contribute to the firm’s 
reputational capital but are treated here as secondary to core activities. 
 
Corporate finance advisory 
 
The sale of ABN Amro illustrates a transaction that required many investment banking 
resource skills. ABN Amro and Barclays Bank announced a consensual merger in early 2007. 
ABN Amro’s boards of directors had been pressured over the bank’s poor earnings and share 
performance: this was their tactical response. Within weeks a counter bid was made by an ad 
hoc consortium of three banks, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Belgium’s Fortis, and Spain’s 
Banco Santander Central Hispano (Santander), an arrangement proposed to RBS by Merrill 
Lynch. Fierce negotiations took place among the parties, with national regulators and through 
the courts in the Netherlands and US until the RBS group’s bid was accepted by ABN Amro 
shareholders in September. All the events described in this narrative occurred in a period of 
eroding confidence, making the deal an infamous ‘top of the market’ phenomenon. 
Confidence continued falling after the sale closed, and so severely eroded the market 
capitalization and reserve ratios of the winning banks as to require RBS and Fortis to raise 
emergency capital within nine months of the takeover in October 2007. Both collapsed within 
a year of the closing and were taken into state ownership.  
 
The transaction was iconic, as the world’s costliest financial sector acquisition and second 
most valuable purchase of any European company, and the first acquisition of a major bank 
opposed by its national regulator. It involved three main components central to M&A 
practice: 
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 Valuation, corporate advisory resources, disclosure preparation for regulatory 
purposes, and acquisition transaction management provided to six major public 
companies in five jurisdictions. 
 Transaction strategy and management in matters relating to compliance, regulatory 
negotiations, official disclosure, and corporate broking and liaison with leading 
investors. 
 Underwriting, arranging and distributing public securities issues for three banks 
totaling €66 billion, including risk management activities customary for new issues. 
 
If this narrative included the aftermath of ABN Amro’s sale, those transactions would include 
further capital raising for two of the bidders, with one deal for RBS in June 2008 becoming 
Europe’s largest fundraising through a share issue. 
 
The purchase and dismemberment of ABN Amro shows much of the scope of modern 
investment banking. It involved virtually all senior European and US corporate finance 
specialists in advising the protagonists, including Merrill Lynch (for the RBS consortium), 
Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Crédit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan Cazenove and Lazard 
(for Barclays), and Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, NM Rothschild and 
UBS (for ABN Amro), as well as two specialist corporate finance advisors, Greenhill & Co 
and Fox-Pitt, Kelton, and ABN Amro’s corporate broker subsidiary, Hoare Govett. The only 
notable pure investment bank absent from the case was New York-based Bear Stearns, which 
had no material M&A practice. Bear Stearns became insolvent in March 2008 and was 
acquired under duress by JPMorgan Chase.  
 
One reason for any corporate bidder or target to pay for such comprehensive advisory 
coverage is to deny later deal access to a new protagonist. Large acquisitions are impossible 
without external corporate finance advice because the investment bank advisor stands as a 
metric and can be judged by investors, the market and its regulators to conform to established 
legal and customary takeover practice, or be held to account by law, regulators or market 
sentiment for breaches of practice or warranty, or failures to disclose material events or 
changes in conditions.  
 
Corporate finance is central to investment bank activities. It can be capital intensive or 
focused on advisory work, and in each case requires the use of varying skills and risk 
appetites. It includes advice on corporate strategy, high-level dealings with stakeholders 
including leading shareholders and governmental agencies, a function known in London as 
corporate broking, and deal solicitation, client coverage, and transaction dealing for corporate 
acquisitions and disposals, reorganizations and rescues. It extends to share flotation through 
initial public offerings (IPOs) or secondary offerings, block trades and vendor placings, 
valuations, M&A strategy in defense or attack, and coordinating fundraising. Since the 1980s, 
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privatization advice and transaction management has been a substantial business throughout 
the world, a use of traditional corporate finance resources in a new setting pioneered in the 
UK by NM Rothschild and Hoare Govett. 
 
The presence in a transaction of an established M&A bank may raise investor confidence in 
the protagonist or a target defending its independence. The bank provides information 
resources to investors through reputational capital and in its presence in the deal. Such 
reputational capital can be ephemeral or confined to specific activities. For example, Merrill 
Lynch enhanced its M&A and securities underwriting reputational capital by managing ABN 
Amro’s acquisition, but separately in late 2007 and 2008 made very considerable losses 
through failing to sell its enormous inventory of unwanted structured securities. Merrill Lynch 
reported in July 2008 a fire sale of securities, write-downs of investments and inventory and 
an emergency capital raising. The bank sold US$30.6 billion in mortgage-related CDOs for 
US$$6.7 billion, but was forced to fund part of the purchase, so that the inflow from the sale 
was US$1.7 billion, or 5.5 per cent of the nominal amount sold. On the same day Merrill 
Lynch announced a US$8.5 billion issue of new shares. In doing so it was made to 
compensate the Singaporean state investor Temasek Holdings for losses sustained on its 
earlier purchases of new Merrill Lynch shares in December 2007 and March 2008. Another 
Asian sovereign wealth fund manager seemed understandably cautious, saying that ‘We have 
learned a lot from investing in Merrill Lynch and will take a more cautious approach in the 
future.’  
 
Contested consortium bids are unusual because they introduce contingent risks into complex 
corporate settings, and were unknown in the financial sector or on the scale needed to secure 
ABN Amro. Merrill Lynch acted as sole advisor to the trio and principal underwriter to each 
for a series of equity and regulatory capital issues to fund the bid. This represents an 
unusually sizeable commitment to support the underwriting and sale of new shares and hybrid 
securities and resources to manage a multifaceted M&A process. Merrill Lynch needed to 
convince core bank regulators in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK and four sets of 
shareholders of its ability to manage and complete the acquisition, including many post-
closing decisions as to the division of ABN Amro’s businesses without offending financial 
authorities elsewhere that might block the transfer of ABN Amro’s operating licenses, and of 
its confidence in arranging new debt and equity issues to fund the purchase. The dissection of 
ABN Amro was instrumental to the consortium proposal. Santander alone met its objectives 
from the outcome. It sold prior to completion its control of ABN Amro’s Italian subsidiary, 
which recouped 50 per cent of Santander’s outlay and left it owning ABN Amro’s profitable 
Brazilian subsidiary, the main reason for its participation. Santander and Merrill Lynch were 
the only winners from the saga, despite the application of enormous reserves of investment 
banking skill. 
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Capital creation in equities, debt and derivatives 
 
The creation of new transactions is a setting in which financial innovation and investment 
bank creativity might be expected to thrive. There have been several lasting results: 
 
 To categorize financial instruments as claims in the form of debt, equity, or derivative 
contracts, or combinations of these elements. 
 To emphasize a convergence between traditional instruments since the late 1970s, 
and the centrality of credit risk transfer within that process. 
 A profusion of new financial instruments, including the emergence of derivatives as a 
separate new class of capital.  
 To assess the behavior of banks and all other financial sector participants through 
their portfolio choices as to expected risk and return. 
 
The three classes of contemporary capital are defined in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Elements of capital 
Debt instruments Borrowing contracts, largely subject to intrinsic commercial terms 
Derivative 
instruments 
Contracts that alter prevailing risk-return qualities of a portfolio of assets 
or liabilities 
Equity instruments Collective ownership contracts, rights to ongoing residual income or 
repayment in winding up, in each case subordinated to other contractual 
claims 
 
The financial innovations discussed in this section have two main features. None existed until 
the 1980s or later; all sprang from investment bank activities or transaction solutions. The 
revenues derived by investment banks from creating or trading these claims varies according 
to aims and commitments of capital and human resources, but in each bank will arise from the 
principal sources listed in Table 4. Except in relation to proprietary trading revenues and 
treasury gains, these sources exclude accruals of income on unsold inventory, where banks 
profit from inadvertent trading positions. 
 
Table 4. Sources of investment bank trading revenue 
Type  Nature of activity 
Underwriting fees Commissions on committing to arrange and execute new issues 
Dealing profits Gains made from block trades, bought deals, or underwritten trades in 
outstanding securities, inventory valuation gains, market-making gross 
profits 
Broking commissions Fees charged for transaction execution 
Proprietary revenue Income from deploying risk capital for own account 
Treasury gains Funding or liability management revenue associated with securities 
activities 
12 
 
 
The listing of new shares is an important source of corporate finance revenue in all 
jurisdictions. Dealing in shares in listed companies for third parties and in proprietary trading 
is significant in investment bank sales and trading activity, with some banks supporting 
dealings with substantial commitments of capital and human and technological resources. 
Among the most profitable practices of modern finance have arisen in vertically-integrated 
banks that shepherd young companies towards IPOs and devote own resources to proprietary 
venture capital.  
 
Debt market transactions and trading can be both profitable and volatile. Banks earn upfront 
fees from most issues but competition makes these rewarding only in cases involving 
complex risks or unusual features. The returns from debt capital market activities generally 
arise from underwriting risk and managing new commitments. Banks compete to ‘buy’ new 
issue mandates at a fixed cost to the issuer, intending to redistribute or ‘reoffer’ the securities 
to investors at a profit. As with major loans, upfront bond fees are not paid but in most cases 
deducted with expenses from the proceeds delivered to the issuer, and are often shared with 
leading investors. 
 
The final class of capital is the result of innovation typical of successful investment banking. 
This is shown most clearly in two developments, the creation of global markets in interest rate 
and currency swaps in the 1980s, and the invention of credit derivatives in the 1990s. The 
latter is now a global market in insurance-like contracts that allow credit protection to be 
bought and sold, but began in single transactions as a means to isolate and hedge certain risks 
embedded in all debt claims. The former originated in a transaction devised in 1981 by 
Salomon Brothers, later part of Citigroup, which gathered new and outstanding parallel bond 
issues for two prominent borrowers together with a new mechanism for the exchange of their 
respective liabilities that became the foundation of today’s global over-the-counter (OTC) 
swaps and derivatives markets. The scheme was a commercial transformation of existing 
contracts that met the immediate needs of Salomon’s clients but which led to radical changes 
to global financial practice. For details of this topic within the handbook see also Dodd, R., 
OTC Derivatives.  
 
IBM Corporation & the World Bank were highly-rated borrowers. As a US dollar based 
company and Wall Street bellwether, IBM tended to raise funds from the capital markets in 
its home currency, but had occasionally borrowed in foreign currencies. The World Bank 
borrowed in currencies with low nominal interest rates, especially deutschemarks and Swiss 
francs (the deutschemark was subsumed into the euro in 1999 and abolished in 2001). By the 
early 1980s regular issuance had tired both markets, and the two borrowers each suffered 
weakening demand and poorer terms. Each issued seldom in the other’s market, creating a 
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potential arbitrage to lessen the total cost of simultaneous new issues with each borrower 
accessing the other’s market. The borrowings would then be exchanged, leaving both IBM 
and the World Bank more favorably funded. This was the arbitrage that Salomon devised. In 
each case, issue rarity would improve the price at which the bonds could be distributed.  
 
IBM had deutschemark and Swiss Franc debts outstanding and so only the World Bank 
needed new funds to make the deal. It borrowed a total of US$290 million in two new issues, 
one with coupon and maturity dates matching those of an outstanding IBM deutschemark 
bond, and the second matching dates on IBM’s Swiss franc issue. The US dollar net proceeds 
were sold at spot for deutschemarks and Swiss francs to fund future loans. Both parties now 
agreed an irrevocable exchange of payments that matched the terms of the four bonds, 
including both principal and periodic coupons. Each borrower effectively accessed the more 
favorable market, exchanged the resulting liabilities, and shared the aggregate overall 
reduction in costs. Figure 2 shows the result in simplified form for the Swiss franc bond and 
one of the two US dollar issues, with the broken lines indicating the commercial boundaries 
of the three contracts. The present value of cashflows on the new World Bank US dollar 
issues were made exactly to match the existing terms of the IBM Swiss franc bonds, taking 
into account ongoing exchanges of currencies. The same process took place for the US dollar-
deutschemark exchange. 
 
Insert Figure 2: Simplified IBM-World Bank Cross-currency Interest Rate Swap 
 
Payments between the counterparties represent the swap, which is intrinsic to the transaction 
but legally separate from the underlying bonds. The two currency swaps are said to be 
derivatives of the bonds, and can be contracted entirely separately. Exchanges of interest 
payments in like currencies form interest rate swaps in the same way. Salomon’s transaction 
was heavily negotiated; similar deals are now commonplace and arranged in minutes by many 
leading banks. The swaps alone can be transacted automatically and in seconds. The OTC 
derivatives markets began in the 1980s with derivative contracts relying on the price behavior 
of underlying assets, but the debt and derivatives markets have developed to a symbiosis, 
where the price of each instrument influences the other and is mutually beneficial to liquidity. 
 
Markets in information and reputational capital 
 
One theory of lending sees the intermediary performing a function associated with 
information, and especially differences in the information available to potential debtors and 
creditors. It focuses on how information asymmetry creates incentives for creditors, debtors, 
intermediaries and depositors to act in certain ways. The bank provides value by intervening 
in the savings and investment channel to provide a vetting and monitoring function in lending 
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decisions and administering loans that would be difficult or impossible for creditors at large. 
It uses skills and experience to price, make and monitor loans more effectively than others, 
that is, to evaluate and bridge asymmetries in information available to a borrower and 
potential creditors.  
 
A similar theory has been articulated in relation to investment banking. Through dealings and 
contacts with borrowers, investors and its competitors, an investment bank creates a market in 
information, which in turn facilitates securities issuance and investment. Investment banks 
provide information on prospective transactions or securities issues through the preparation 
and transmission of research to investors, that is, to provide a market in information. This 
suggests that the resources marshaled for financial intermediation by investment banks in 
transaction arrangement, credit research, and in underwriting and distributing issues of 
securities are valuable to investors and borrowers for identical informational reasons. In 
particular, the investment bank adds credibility to information provided by a borrower by 
exploiting its accumulated reputational capital, or the perception of itself and others of skills, 
trustworthiness, confidence, and competence in the resources it offers to clients or are 
witnessed from completed past deals. This can be regarded as a positional good, since it 
concerns not the absolute performance effectiveness of a single investment bank, but the 
market’s perception of that performance in relation to other competitor banks. 
 
A trustworthy and well-resourced bank may be able to convince third party investors that the 
opportunity that it reveals to them is attractive and meets their preferences; a less well-
regarded bank would fail by the same test. This means that there are opposing solutions to 
financial intermediation, one involving an internal process conducted within a bank lender, 
and the other organized externally by an investment bank. Whether a borrower chooses one 
alternative or the other depends on their respective perceived transaction costs. The same 
considerations face a potential saver given the choice of making a deposit with a commercial 
bank or buying from an investment bank securities issued by that commercial bank (which are 
closely related credit risks even given their different priorities in law). 
 
Reputational capital depends on banks demonstrating a consistently high competence in 
engaging with the market. Intangible capital amassed in this way will be eroded by 
transactions that fail to match general performance expectations, by engaging in malpractice, 
or by misjudgments as to price or value. A second conflict occurs when competing investment 
banks suffer similar losses in reputational capital. Since reputational capital is intrinsically 
linked to comparisons between firms, there may be cases where the entire industry acts in 
ways that regulators or clients deplore and where the results lead to changes in practice, rather 
than a loss of transactional favor by a single bank. Two notable examples of this herd 
behavior have taken place in the new millennium: 
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 Conflicts within banks where sell-side research is used habitually to obtain mandates 
from borrowers. This was exposed among many US and European investment banks 
after a collapse in technology and internet share prices in 2000. Investors were 
induced to buy shares by favorable research reports prepared for and paid by issuers, 
and banks engaged in price manipulation of IPOs to reward leading clients. Twelve 
prominent banks made payments in 2003 to forestall claims for fraud and misconduct, 
prominent analysts were convicted of market manipulation and barred from Wall 
Street, and the banking industry consented to a rigorous separation of research from 
corporate finance. 
 The herd withdrawal of investors and liquidity in 2007-08 was coupled with 
condemnation of those banks that had arranged and sold highly structured issues. A 
strong source of revenue quickly became the cause of profound losses. Few 
investment banks maintained their reputational capital, not least because the 
structured finance market had been the result of innovation and was central to their 
interests. Conflicts were equally clear in credit rating agency practice for structured 
securities. The three leading agencies were so deeply engaged in iterative modeling 
with banks as to be tantamount to being co-originators. Finally, the practices of banks 
as distributors of complex transactions to investors appeared to conflict with their 
position as deal originators, for all such securities are so proprietary as to make it 
improbable for their being subject to market making – where banks commit to the 
market to provide prices at which they stand willing to buy or sell securities. 
 
One difficulty in discussing reputational capital in the financial sector is that it may be 
impossible to measure. Several analysts have sought to identify a causal relationship between 
the reputation of investment banks and the terms or post-issue performance of the transactions 
they arrange, but the results may be of limited value due to the difficulty of finding an 
acceptable proxy for reputation. One method is to identify reputation through surveys, for 
example asking corporate treasurers their opinions of banks in certain activities. More 
rigorous (and a marketing tool for all bankers) are performance league tables, showing deals 
of different types arranged by competing banks. League tables appeared in the early 
Eurobond markets in the 1970s, published by the financial industry equivalent of celebrity 
websites, and were often studied more closely by bankers than their clients. Today they are 
collated by data providers with great attention to detail and cover all transactions that can be 
aggregated. Tables are ubiquitous in markets for new issues and M&A transactions, measured 
by number and value of completed deals. Self-selected league tables are intrinsic in client 
marketing by banks. Industry journal International Financing Review publishes over 80 
weekly tables of debt and equity issues, analyzed by all significant descriptive variables. 
League tables are ubiquitous but prone to distortion and are best seen as a proxy for 
reputational capital for lack of alternatives. Nothing in league tables shows the profitability of 
transactions or any systemic risk incurred in their execution. At the year’s end data compilers 
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are watchful for ‘league table deals’ or transactions arranged without compensation or with 
pliable affiliates.  
 
While the value of reputational capital has been tested in only limited circumstances, there is 
evidence to suggest that it is real. A study of American public companies in 1895-1913 
showed that the presence on a company’s board of directors of a representative of J.P. 
Morgan & Co had a significant positive effect on its share price performance, and that this 
could be attributed not to Morgan possessing monopoly power but to expectations that the 
Morgan director signified effective monitoring of the company by a trusted advisor. 
Preservation of reputational capital was so important for Morgan that it refrained from 
abusing its dominant position, for example, by charging excessive new issue fees or broking 
commissions, which is an unconventional view of monopoly behavior. A popular finance text, 
Brealey, Myers & Allen’s Principles of Corp Finance, ponders this matter: 
 
‘There are many successful innovations that cannot be explained […] Why do 
investment banks continue to invent, and successfully sell, complex new securities 
that outstrip our ability to value them? The truth is we don't understand why some 
innovations in markets succeed and others never get off the ground.’  
 
The answers may not be easily quantified but plausible explanations can be found in this 
chapter’s assessment of reputational capital and market practice: 
 
 Rent-seeking is an important explanation. First, banks seek to differentiate 
themselves before prospective clients, so that constructing a new label for a 
transaction or making a contract structure appear to differ from others in a conceptual 
way may provide a competitive edge of some kind. Second, even with genuine 
innovation, the demise of legitimate rents tends to happen quickly in that nothing in 
financial intermediation is protected by copyright and imitation is relatively simple 
when it relies largely on human capital. 
 Given that investors must always deploy funds even in severe downturns or periods 
of extreme risk aversion, the process of innovation is self-reinforcing. Transactions to 
conserve wealth can be as rewarding to the arranger as those characterized as 
aggressive. 
 This is not to say that transactional or organizational innovation in investment 
banking is not genuine but that many finance scholars err in treating one financial 
instrument as differing materially from others. 
 
One study of securities underwriting behavior found evidence that risk decisions taken by 
investment banks reflected their concerns as to reputational capital, and may therefore be 
taken as a proxy indicator of the quality of new issues. Given also that reputational capital is 
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associated with economic rents each bank has an incentive to maintain its reputational capital 
so as to generate revenue.  
 
Questions, concerns & post-crisis outcomes 
 
In spite of the loss of output and employment associated with the 2007-09 global financial 
crisis and the costs involved in recapitalizing many of the world’s banks, it is unclear whether 
transactional complexity that results from financial innovation represents a potential welfare 
cost. The negative view is now held by many leading regulators, and is clearly a popular 
political cause. The hostile argument is that complex investment banking wastes resources 
compared to the more productive real economy, partly by creating false incentives for 
systemically risky activities, notwithstanding evidence from many studies that financial 
sophistication has a generally positive causal effect on economic development. US and EU 
post-crisis reforms will constrain banks in their proprietary trading and control of hedge 
funds. The Volcker rule included in the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 requires that by mid-2014 such activities are restricted or prohibited, 
encouraging banks to limit or devolve their involvement to separate organizations well ahead 
of the deadline. Implementation of the rule is beset by definitional problems. 
 
This chapter has argued that investment banks can be associated with innovation through new 
techniques, instruments or forms of investment media. The case study of ABN Amro shows 
the effectiveness of one such bank. By deploying strong corporate finance and fundraising 
skills and being willing to accept appreciable underwriting risks in troubled conditions, 
Merrill Lynch successfully closed a landmark acquisition and pocketed considerable advisory 
and underwriting fees. This is investment bank practice at its most demanding and 
resourceful, brilliant in execution but capable of poor results. It is one example of an enduring 
paradox. If investment banks are innovative, competitive and highly-skilled in transaction and 
risk management, why is the sector prone to poor management and periodic shocks? Even 
well regarded banks have been involved in controversial or unethical practices, or ignoring 
conflicts of interest in acting for clients or in proprietary dealings. Many banks accepted as 
leaders in their fields since the 1990s no longer exist, as a sample shows:  
 
 Bankers Trust Company, prolific structured debt arranger and derivative specialist. 
Acquired in 1998 after losses by Deutsche Bank. 
 Barclays de Zoete Wedd (BZW), the first integrated UK investment bank and never 
profitable. Dismembered and sold largely to CS First Boston in 1998. 
 Barings & Co, a venerable merchant bank. Destroyed by fraudulent trading to which 
senior management was blind. 
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 Bear Stearns & Co, once the fifth largest US investment bank. Collapsed after 
reckless trading. 
 Dean Witter & Co, Kidder Peabody & Co, and Paine Webber & Co, substantial US 
brokerage firms acquired by competitors after persistently poor results. 
 Drexel, Burnham Lambert, leading leveraged finance specialist and high yield bond 
underwriter, collapsed after persistent fraud.  
 Lehman Brothers, Wall Street’s fourth largest investment bank, became insolvent. 
 Peregrine Investments Holdings, successful Asian corporate finance house made 
insolvent in 1997-98 by poor risk management in debt securities. 
 Salomon Brothers, US debt securities specialist, fined in 1991 for market 
manipulation and sold to Citigroup, its reputational capital lost. 
 Yamaichi Securities, top four Japanese broker, collapsed in 1997 from fraud and 
losses. 
 
In each case, all or parts of the victim were forcibly acquired. Barings was sold in 1996 for a 
nominal £1 after its capital was wiped out by catastrophic losses, on a scale that might have 
been abated by competent risk management. Lehman’s ingenuity and management hubris was 
unable to protect the bank against a total collapse of confidence. Peregrine was successful in 
Hong Kong corporate finance and broking but broadened its activities, believing that it could 
compete with non-Asian banks or remain independent only by engaging in fixed income and 
derivatives, but did so in a way that lacked both competence and sufficient capital. The firm 
collapsed in late 1997 from losses on those new businesses even as its core businesses 
continued to flourish. Poor management is common to all these failures. After research and 
sales conflicts and other malpractice were revealed among US investment banks in 2000-01, 
The Economist stated in 2001 that ‘Investment banks are among the worst-managed 
institutions on the planet because they are built on a loose confederation of franchises and 
outsize egos.’  
 
Speculative trading is popularly associated with instability but there may also be a theoretical 
link with which investment banking is also concerned. That systemic instability may be 
associated with financialisation and speculation was suggested by economist Hyman Minsky 
in the early 1980s but his theory was neglected and long untested. Minksy proposed that the 
behavior of market participants grows less regarding of risk during periods of general 
appreciating asset prices. This makes precipitant falls in values increasingly likely. When 
prices fall, traders sell their most valuable or conservative assets because they provide the 
freest liquidity at the least discount to nominal value, which then intensifies the overall price 
fall, even though it appears to be irrational herd behavior not predicted by traditional finance 
theory. Minsky’s writings and reputation have been rediscovered as the post-crisis world 
searches for ways to explain the unfathomable.  
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A determined effort to lessen the extent of global financialisation would be limiting for 
investment banks and financial innovation. Post-crisis re-regulation is demanding limits to 
investment banks’ contractual freedom of action, and may lead to a bifurcation of investment 
banking activity and financial innovation generally. This would produce a limited number of 
global banks engaged in capital intensive transactions and trading, and a larger number of 
smaller firms and asset managers engaged in specialist business streams and without the full 
regulation to which all acknowledged banks must submit. In this way, the investment banking 
sector may return to its merchant bank partnership roots. 
 
Does the 2008-09 crisis signal the death of investment banking? In the sense of untrammeled 
financial innovation, the answer may be ‘yes’ but it is difficult to disinvent practices that have 
proven profitable for many users, even if the broader welfare effects are questionable. The 
death of investment banking is unlikely in the sense of an abandonment of functional, 
product-directed innovation, but it is likely for a time to be accompanied by a closer degree of 
official supervision. The crisis may well signal the end of the 1990s Anglo-American 
investment banking model of high balance sheet and credit risk leverage, and of the free 
manipulation of risk to and from the balance sheets of large intermediaries. What comes 
afterwards will test investment banking innovation, and the quality of both bank management 
and national supervision. 
 
Glossary 
Arbitrage. Transactions or trading 
strategies that exploit evident price 
inconsistencies, especially between 
separate markets or interfaces. 
 
Bought deal. A transaction in which a 
bank buys new securities from an issuer at 
a fixed price, intending to resell the 
holding at a profit. 
 
Buy-side. Investment bank resources in 
research, trading or broking directed to 
issuers and borrowers. 
 
Commitment. Formal willingness to 
provide credit or acquire risk. 
 
Credit risk transfer. Any commercial 
process allowing an actor to acquire or 
shed credit risk, whether or not it involves 
the movement of a capital sum. 
 
Mandate. Conditional, abbreviated limited 
life contract containing a client’s exclusive 
transaction instructions to its bank; an 
arranger’s license. 
 
Regulatory arbitrage. Commercial 
behavior decisively influenced by 
regulatory conditions or transnational 
regulatory differences. 
 
Sell-side. Investment bank resources in 
research, trading or broking directed to 
investors. 
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Syndicate. Deal-specific group of banks 
assembled by an arranger to defray 
underwrite commitments, and in some 
cases to apportion distribution. 
 
Trading. Buying or selling securities or 
other financial claims. Trading can be risk-
neutral, conservative or aggressive in 
either execution or results. 
 
 
Underwriting. Short-term contingent 
commitment made by a bank to fund a 
transaction so as to ensure its completion 
on agreed terms. The bank would aim to 
redistribute all or part of the resulting risk.  
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